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Abstract 
This paper provides the first systematic analysis of the choice of green office 
space by commercial tenants. We analyze the decisions of more than 11,000 tenants to 
choose office space in green buildings or in otherwise comparable non-green buildings 
located  nearby.  We  formulate  six  propositions  to  explain  why  specific  firms  and 
industries may be more likely to lease green space. We test these propositions using the 
tenants in a matched sample of more than 1,100 green office buildings and 3,900 nearby 
non-green buildings.  
We analyze variations in the occupancy of green office space across firms and 
industries, identifying those firms which have the highest occupancy in green buildings 
and those firms whose office utilization is more heavily concentrated in green buildings. 
We also identify the industries with the largest occupancy in green buildings and those 
industries whose space utilization is more heavily concentrated in green buildings. 
We  find  that  corporations  in  the  oil  and  banking  industries,  as  well  as 
government-related and non-profit organizations, are among the most prominent green 
tenants. After appropriately controlling for building quality and for specific locations 
within one quarter mile, we find that firms in mining and construction and organizations 
in public administration are relatively more likely to rent green. The empirical analysis 
shows that tenants in these industry groups are significantly more likely to occupy green 
office space. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The  TNT  Group,  a  global  express  delivery  service  headquartered  in  the 
Netherlands,  recently  announced  that  it  would  move  its  operations  to  three  newly-
developed green office buildings. The decision is rooted in the broader corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) policy adopted by the TNT Group. The firm’s policy states that “it 
is our aim to invest in mitigating our impact on the environment.” This is but one of a 
great many examples of conscious decisions by firms to choose “green” buildings. It 
suggests that real estate is a key element of the CSR and marketing policies of some 
companies.  Similar  considerations  may  influence  strategic  decision-making  in  many 
different kinds of firms. 
Yet the use of green space by corporations and organizations has received scant 
attention in the fast growing management literature relating business organizations and 
the  natural  environment.  In  a  recent  and  comprehensive  survey  of  this  literature, 
corporate housing decisions were not mentioned at all (Etzion, 2007). But real estate 
decisions can form a large part of the environmental footprint of corporations. After all, 
buildings and their associated construction activity account for almost a third of world 
greenhouse gas emissions (Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, RICS, 2005). 
The behavior of corporate tenants can have important implications for the shift to 
a more sustainable built environment, as changes in demand force real estate suppliers to 
adapt rapidly to the environmental expectations of tenants. These expectations translate 
into financial incentives for the property investment industry, as the shifting preferences 
of tenants affect rental rates on commercial buildings and the volatility of flows of rental 
income arising from changes in occupancy. If tenants increasingly prefer to lease green  
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space rather than conventional office space, then a differential in rental rates between 
green and conventional buildings is inevitable. Moreover, it is possible that the non-green 
commercial properties will depreciate faster, and occupancy rates might be lower. 
In a recent paper (Eichholtz, et al, 2009), we analyzed the economic value of U.S. 
office buildings certified with a green label, that is, buildings with an Energy Star or 
LEED certification. We found that these “green” buildings command a premium in rental 
rates and sales prices over conventional office buildings. Moreover, the analysis showed 
that occupancy rates are higher, and these rates are less volatile than rates in commercial 
office buildings without a green label. This suggests that there is an identifiable group of 
tenants willing to pay a premium to lease green space. This research also shows that part 
of the rental and value increment can be explained by climatic factors and the thermal 
attributes  of  green  buildings,  so  immediate  effects  on  firm  profitability  derived from  
lower utility costs are important. However, a part of the increment for a green building 
may not be explained by energy savings alone. Other factors are at work. 
Clearly,  some  particular  firms  must  have  preferences  for  green  office  space. 
Understanding  the  motivation  for  this  choice  of  “sustainable”  real  estate  may  be 
important for two reasons. First, for the property sector to undertake the development of 
sustainable commercial real estate and for the investment community to finance these 
investments, it is important to identify the characteristics of potential tenants for this 
more expensive space. Second, a better understanding of those firms predisposed to seek 
“sustainable’”  real  estate  may  allow  researchers,  managers,  and  policy  makers  to 
determine the scope for voluntary measures, relative to regulation and command-and-
control mechanisms, to promote green investments (Bansal and Roth, 2000).  
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In this paper, we identify four factors influencing environmental decision-making 
with respect to corporate space-leasing decisions. First, occupancy of buildings with a 
green label can be economically profitable, as the operating costs of these buildings may 
be lower, and improved employee well-being may enhance productivity or reduce labor 
costs. Second, a green corporate headquarters and the use of green space in general may 
signal to stakeholders and customers that a firm has a long-run commitment to a CSR 
policy and is willing to pay for it. The occupancy of sustainable buildings can therefore 
have  indirect  economic  effects  through  an  improved  reputation.  For  example,  such  a 
policy may attract and retain employees and customers. Third, by voluntarily accepting 
higher environmental standards now, firms can anticipate future legislation and avoid the 
risk  of  costly  adjustment  later.  Fourth,  although  the  attention  of  investors  is  focused 
understandably on firm profits, there is a distinct group of potential tenants for whom the 
non-financial utility from pursuing an active CSR policy exceeds the potential monetary 
costs  of  such  a  policy.  This  suggests  that  non-profit  organizations  and  governments 
agencies may be actively engaged in CSR in advance of purely profit-maximizing firms. 
In consideration of these factors, we postulate that firms in specific industries, for 
example, those in the space-intensive tertiary sector, or firms whose operations may be 
judged more costly to the environment, are more willing to lease green office space, even 
if  this  implies  paying  premium rents.  We  test  these  propositions  exploiting  a  unique 
sample  of  office  buildings  with  an Energy Star  and/or LEED-rating,  matched  with  a 
control sample of nearby office buildings without such ratings. 
We  collect  data  on  the  identity  of  tenants  and  the  industry  characteristics  of 
tenants  in  these  buildings  and  construct  a  control  sample  of  other  office  buildings  
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matched on geographical characteristics. Using data on more than 3,100 tenants in 1,180 
green office buildings, and on a control sample of approximately 8,000 tenants in 4,000 
conventional office buildings, we find that the mining and construction companies, as 
well as government and government-related organizations, are systematically more likely 
to lease green office space rather than conventional space when compared to corporate 
tenants in other industries. Furthermore, the analysis shows that a substantial number of 
firms in the oil and the financial services industry are among the largest occupiers of 
green office buildings. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize previous work on 
the environmental decisions of private firms, and we develop a theoretical framework to 
address why firms in some specific industries might choose to pay higher occupancy 
costs to “rent green.” Section 3 provides an overview of the data, the methods, and some 
descriptive information. Section 4 presents results, and Section 5 is a brief conclusion. 
CSR AND REAL PROPERTY 
The  mantra  of  “corporate  social  responsibility”  is  increasingly  popular  among 
business leaders, and it has become an important element in strategic decision-making. In 
addition, the business case for recognizing CSR is getting stronger; several empirical 
studies have concluded that companies that take CSR into account outperform other firms 
in financial terms.
1 The investment  community has embraced the concept of  socially 
responsible investments (SRI) with enthusiasm. For example, the number of SRI mutual 
funds has grown rapidly. SRI assets under management increased from $639 billion in 
1995 to $2.71 trillion in 2007 (Social Investment Forum, 2007). Important institutional 
                                                 
1 See Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001), for an overview.  
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investors  like  APG  in  the  Netherlands  and  TIAA-CREF  in  the  United  States  have 
formulated  and  implemented  an  SRI  strategy,  a  strategy  which  is  consistently 
communicated  to  the  capital  markets  and  to  their  clients. However,  evidence  on  the 
relative performance of SRI investments is rather inconclusive
2. 
In evaluating socially responsible investment decisions, investors focus on issues 
such as the impact of a firm’s operations on the environment, the treatment of employees, 
and the social role of the firm in the broader society – often based on indices of CSR 
behavior (for example, the benchmarks produced by Kinder, Domini and Lydenberg, 
KLD, Innovest, or the Dow Jones Sustainability Index) which are now widely available. 
External agents routinely screen firms on their corporate real estate and leasing decisions, 
as it is recognized more clearly that commercial real estate is of real consequence in 
matters of environmental sustainability. 
Indeed, evidence shows that the property sector accounts for forty percent of U.S. 
energy consumption and 38 percent of carbon dioxide emissions (U.S. Department of 
Energy,  www.doe.gov).  Awareness  of  these  facts  has  lead  to  a  range  of  different 
environmental  rating  systems  for  commercial  properties,  such  as  the  Leadership  in 
Energy  and  Environment  Design  (LEED)  and  Energy  Star  in  the  United  States, 
BREEAM  in  the  United  Kingdom,  and  GreenStar  in  Australia.  These  environmental 
labels provide both landlords and tenants with a yardstick to measure the “greenness” of 
properties. 
Incorporating sustainability in real estate investment decisions seems to pay off. 
Eichholtz, et al (2009) provide evidence that rents and transaction prices in green office 
buildings  exceed  those  paid  for  conventional  office  buildings,  while  controlling  for 
                                                 
2 See Renneboog et al (2008), for an overview.  
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quality and location-specific characteristics. Effective rents are estimated to be about six 
percent above those of conventional office buildings and transaction prices are estimated 
to be 16 percent higher. Decomposition of this “green” premium provides more insight; 
the  size  of  the  premium  in  rents  and  selling  prices  depends  on  the  extent  to  which 
buildings are energy efficient. However, energy efficiency alone does not completely 
explain the green increment commanded by labeled buildings. 
The utility from leasing green space may differ across potential tenants; owners of 
firms may have a utility function that incorporates a set of corporate and societal values 
(Bollen,  2008).  If  these  values are  important  to  the  owners  of  firms,  we  can  expect 
tenants to benefit from leasing space in green buildings, and, more importantly, to obtain 
economic and other advantages from actively pursuing an environmental policy. In the 
case of CSR, financial and non-financial motives are not mutually exclusive. 
Adapting the framework of Bansal and Roth (2000), we define four rationales that 
might  induce  social  responsiveness  in  corporate  real  estate  decision-making:  direct 
economic benefits, indirect benefits, risk avoidance, and ethical motives. Based on these 
considerations, we develop propositions as to which industries may be most responsive to 
social responsibility in their decisions about real estate. 
 
Corporate Responsibility in Real Estate 
Direct economic benefits 
CSR can have  a direct effect on the economic  profitability of firms. Under a 
traditional view, CSR poses an inherent conflict between maximizing financial value for 
shareholders and maximizing social welfare (Baumol, 1991; Friedman, 1970; Shleifer,  
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2004). Indeed, there is room to question the validity of CSR as a value-enhancing concept 
(Devinney, 2009). However, an increasing number of studies suggest that incorporating 
social responsibility in the strategy of the firm does not reduce – and may even enhance – 
the value of the firm, for example, through lower operating costs and increased efficiency 
(Guenster et al, 2009; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). Indeed, for commercial buildings, 
energy – an important element of sustainability – represents a substantial cost of building 
operations. Energy costs are nearly ten percent of rents. These costs can be decreased 
through  energy  efficiency  measures  that  are  often  integral  to  green  building  design. 
Anecdotal evidence shows that green buildings, on average, use thirty percent less energy 
than conventional buildings (Kats, 2003). Thus, leasing space in more energy efficient 
buildings can have a direct impact on occupancy costs. 
Another  potential  benefit  of  occupancy  in  a  green  building  is  an  increase  in 
employee productivity. Several studies report a positive correlation between a building’s 
internal environment (e.g. its indoor air quality) and employee health and productivity. 
The potential gains of reduced sick leave and productivity gains are substantial, and it has 
been asserted that these benefits exceed costs by a wide margin (Apte, Fisk, and Daisey, 
2000;  Fisk  and  Rosenfeld,  1997).  The  enhanced  indoor  air  quality  arising  from  an 
improved building structure, and from better heating, cooling and ventilation systems is 
most  beneficial  for  space-intensive  firms,  especially  those  with  operations  primarily 
located in office buildings, and for firms largely dependent on human capital, such as 
firms in the tertiary sector.
3 
                                                 
3 We should note that the scientific basis of assertions about higher productivity in green buildings appears 
to be quite weak. But a widespread perception of increases in productivity or morale by firm managers may 
in itself be sufficient to affect the choice of office space.  
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Indirect economic benefits 
Economic opportunities following from the relocation of corporate activities in 
green buildings could also arise indirectly. These ancillary – often hard to measure – 
benefits may stem from an improved corporate reputation. Fombrun (1996) argues that a 
firm’s  reputation  is  derived  from  its  credibility,  trustworthiness,  reliability  and 
responsibility. Responsibility in itself is a function of environmental, financial and social 
behavior (Miles and Covin, 2000). A continuum in the adaptation of environmental and 
social  behavior  ranges  from  simply  complying  with  legislation  to  incorporating  CSR 
proactively  in  daily  operations.  Leasing  space  in  a  green  building  may  reify  the 
environmental  and  social  awareness  of  a  firm  and  may  signal  the  superior  social 
responsibility of the tenants who locate there. In the end, the implementation of CSR 
policies  rather  than  the  simple  policy  commitment  is  necessary  to  reap  the  business 
benefits of CSR (Ramus and Montiel, 2005). 
Some  have  argued  that  the  position  of  a  firm  in  the  CSR  continuum  is  not 
conditioned externally by society (Devinney, 2009). Nevertheless there is ample evidence 
that stakeholder pressure can affect corporate decision-making. Firms pay more attention 
to  the  larger  and  more  powerful  corporate  stakeholders:  investors,  customers,  and 
employees (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997). 
Awareness is increasing among investors of the financial impact of inadequate 
environmental  management,  and  some  segments  of  the  investment  community  avoid 
investing  in  corporations  that  cause  social  injury  or  environmental  damage  (Spicer, 
1978). For example, it has been reported recently that institutional investors (such as 
pension  funds,  university  endowments,  banks  and  insurance  companies)  are  
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systematically  underinvested  in  so-called  “sin”  stocks (Hong  and  Kacperczyk,  2007). 
Major pension funds such as CalPERS, California and APG, Netherlands, have publicly 
announced  positions  to  avoid  investments  in  companies  with  socially  unacceptable 
operations. CalPERS has also initiated one of the first green property funds: the Hines 
CalPERS Green Development Fund. This fund was formed in August 2006 to develop 
sustainable  office  buildings  that  are  certified  through  the  Leadership  in  Energy  and 
Environmental Design (LEED) program. 
If leasing green office space leads to a superior reputation, this may enable firms 
to attract investors more easily and at better market rates (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). 
Some empirical studies have argued that companies with highly developed environmental 
and social engagement are able to obtain better credit ratings, thereby lowering the cost 
of debt (Bassen, Meyer, and Schlange, 2006) and lowering the implied cost of equity 
(Derwall, 2007). Companies that frequently rely on the public capital market will profit 
from a lower cost of debt or equity. 
Second, it is asserted that “customers drive corporations green” (Vandermerwe 
and Oliff, 1990). Firms operating in competitive markets are exhorted by customers to 
incorporate  environmental  responsiveness  in  manufacturing,  research,  and  marketing. 
These consumers can now screen firms on their social and environmental engagement. 
This can pay off. A superior reputation – for example through ethical behavior – may 
appeal to certain segments of customers (Auger et al, 2003). This may enable firms to 
increase sales or to charge premium prices (Creyer and Ross, 1997; Klein and Leffler, 
1981). The importance of reputation among customers depends on the domain in which a 
firm  operates  and  the  degree  to  which  it  interacts  directly  with  retail  customers.  
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Reputation effects are important for the largest and most visible firms in an industry, as 
these companies, like McDonalds, Starbucks, and Wal-Mart, are usually under the direct 
scrutiny of end-consumers and the media (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). The availability 
of information from investment analysts and arbiters of CSR performance might benefit 
large firms disproportionally, but this simultaneously increases stakeholder pressure to 
engage actively in sustainable investments. 
Alternatively,  for  those  involved  in  risky  technologies  (e.g.,  nuclear  or 
biotechnology), in national and international public policy debates (e.g., those active in 
certain oppressive societies), or those operating in controversial product-markets (e.g., 
tobacco or weapons), having a CSR policy may simply be a way to alter a negative image 
or to offset a bad reputation (Chen, Patten, and Roberts, 2008). However, Strahilevitz 
(2003) argues that CSR activities generally do not enhance the reputation of firms that are 
perceived to be unethical. This dictum applies especially for firms supporting causes that 
are related to their own business, e.g. a tobacco company supporting a cancer foundation, 
which may simply increase the perceptions of self-serving behavior. (Forehand and Grier, 
2003). But leasing green space is neutral in that regard. Thus, corporate rental policy 
could  potentially  help  in  offsetting  a  negative  corporate  image  or  in  improving  the 
reputation of firms in objectionable industries. 
Third,  a  superior  reputation  may  enable  firms  to  attract  and  retain  a  better 
workforce (Turban and Greening, 1997). Indeed, Koh and Boo (2004) show that there is 
some evidence of a relation between the social activities of companies and employee 
satisfaction. Increasingly, human capital is viewed as a key source of value creation in 
modern firms (Zingales, 2000); the attraction and retention of employees is especially  
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important in economies and industries where skilled employees are scarce and skills are 
inelastically supplied. A recent paper by Edmans (2007) shows that employee satisfaction 
is  positively  related  to  financial  performance;  employee  satisfaction  is  affected  by 
pecuniary benefits, but also by the quality of working conditions. 
Risk avoidance 
Governmental legislation greatly affects the social responsiveness of firms. This 
is straightforward; failure to comply with legislation may be costly. A large number of 
U.S. companies are sued each year for some alleged violation of environmental laws; the 
likelihood of becoming target of environmental litigation is strongly dependent on the 
industry  type  and  the  location  of  operations.  For  example,  firms  in  environmentally 
sensitive industries are more exposed to media visibility, which shapes the public’s view 
of firm activities (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990).  
The litigation costs can be direct, through administrative and civil penalties, or 
indirect,  through  negative  market  responses  following  public  announcement  of  an 
environmental  lawsuit  (Kassinis  and  Vafeas,  2002).  Especially  in  hazardous  and 
resource-intensive industries, it may be likely that the monetary gains from going beyond 
minimal compliance with rules and regulations will largely offset the initial investment. 
Although  the  real  estate  sector  can  hardly  be  classified  as  a  particularly  hazardous 
industry, corporate tenants might still be vulnerable to costly litigation related to the labor 
environment  (e.g.,  asbestos,  formaldehyde).  Leasing  sustainable  office  space  may 
certainly decrease the risk of future employee litigation, by providing high indoor air 
quality standards and by demonstrating the firm’s commitment to its workforce.  
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Furthermore, by anticipating future legislative changes, firms can avoid costly 
organizational  and  operational  restructuring.  With  respect  to  real  estate,  property 
investors  or  firms  that  own  their  corporate  properties  risk  costly  renovations  if 
environmental building standards become very strict. The adoption of the relatively strict 
building requirements by the U.S. General Services Administration is testimony to this 
development.  By  investing  in  more  sustainable  buildings,  some  of  this  risk  can  be 
reduced. Moreover, many energy-saving measures are much cheaper to incorporate in 
new buildings than in existing ones. Property developers and the future owners of the 
offices they develop face a trade-off between a certain, but relatively small investment 
now,  and  an  uncertain,  but  much  larger  required  investment  later.  The  increasing 
likelihood of regulation makes early investment more attractive.  
Ethical behavior 
“Corporate social engagement” originally referred to the ethical motives of firms 
rather than financial gains (Bowen, 1953), but for political and economic reasons the 
focus  of  social  engagement  is  often  directed  towards  the  economic  advantages  of 
incorporating CSR in strategic decision-making. However, the first-movers and early-
adopters  of  social  and  environmental  innovations  are  often  those  parties  for  whom 
monetary gains are of secondary importance. Federal and local governments and non-
profit organizations are eager to demonstrate their environmental engagement through 
leasing space in green buildings, just because this is “the right thing to do” (Wood, 1991). 
Moreover, these governmental and non-profit organizations are subject to less market 
discipline. With a soft budget constraint, any premium for renting green space may be 
less onerous.   
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Propositions 
The  four  factors  relating  real  estate  decision-making  to  CSR  imply  different 
weights for firms in different industries. By exploring the varying degrees to which firms 
from different industries rent green offices, we can investigate the motivations for doing 
so. Based on this idea, we formulate six propositions, which will be analyzed and tested 
by relying upon detailed information on individual corporate tenants for a large sample of 
commercial office buildings in the U.S. 
 
Proposition I: Firms in the tertiary sector, i.e. the service industry, profit most 
from the cost savings and the improved perception of the working environment of green 
office buildings. Therefore, they will have a higher likelihood of renting green office 
space. 
 
Proposition II. As stakeholder pressure regarding CSR is more intensely directed 
at the largest and most visible firms in an industry, these are more likely to act in a social 
and  environmentally  responsible  manner.  These  firms  will  therefore  have  a  higher 
likelihood of leasing green office space. 
 
Proposition  III.  Firms  with  environmentally  sensitive  operations  will  be  more 
likely to lease green office  space, as this can help to offset otherwise more negative 
corporate images. 
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Proposition IV. Firms in industries that are dependent on high levels of human 
capital and high wage workers are more likely to rent office space in green buildings. 
 
Proposition  V:  Government,  government-related  organizations,  and  non-profit 
institutions are more likely to act in socially responsible ways, and thus to lease green 
space, as monetary factors are of less importance. The possibly higher cost of leasing 
green space can be more easily passed on to the taxpayer or sponsors. 
 
Proposition VI: Firms that are concerned about customer responses will adjust 
their CSR actions to their industry peers. 
 
Analysis 
We analyze the phenomenon of green buildings in the commercial office sector in 
four  distinct  but  related  ways.  We  relate  each  of  these  analyses  to  the  theoretical 
framework  and  propositions  developed  in  this  section.  First,  we  report  those  entities 
which consume the largest amount of green office space, and we report the industries 
(that is, the Standard Industrial Categories, SICs) which consume the largest amount of 
green  office  space.  Second,  we  analyze  the  concentration  of  tenants  in  green  office 
buildings  relative  to  comparable  nearby  conventional  buildings.  We  analyze 
concentration in terms of the number of tenants and the industrial classification of tenants 
in green buildings as compared to a control sample. Third, we analyze the propensity of 
different  industries  to  choose  green  buildings  instead  of  otherwise  identical  nearby 
conventional  buildings.  Fourth,  we  compare  the  fraction  of  office  space  occupied  by  
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various industry groupings in a given green buildings with the fraction occupied by the 
same industries in otherwise identical control buildings.  
DATA AND METHODS 
We focus on tenants in commercial office buildings that have received an Energy 
Star  or  LEED  certification.  These  green  labels  represent  the  most  widely  used 
certifications of building sustainability in the United States. They differ in two main 
aspects: their origin and the aspects of sustainability they measure. The Energy Star label 
is a joint initiative of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department 
of  Energy.  The  Energy  Star  program  was  initially  introduced  to  measure  the  energy 
efficiency of computers and home appliances; the label was later extended to include 
residential as well as non-residential real estate. The label focuses solely on energy use, 
and  does  not  measure  other  building  characteristics  that  are  potentially  relevant  to 
sustainability.  The  energy  performance  and  emissions  of  commercial  and  industrial 
facilities  are  certified  by  a  licensed  engineer.  Buildings  that  are  among  the  top  one 
quarter  of  comparable  buildings  in  the  country  in  energy  efficiency  are  eligible  for 
Energy Star certification. 
  As of January 2009, there were approximately 6,500 buildings with an Energy 
Star label, of which some 2,500 were office buildings. 
The Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) is a third party 
certification program, initiated in 2000 by the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC), a 
non-profit  organization.  Besides  energy  efficiency,  LEED  certification  is  based  on  a 
range  of  criteria  and  relies  on  a  complex  point  system.  The  landlord  rates  the 
performance of a building in six different categories, and projects must satisfy particular  
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prerequisites to earn points. The six categories include sustainable sites, water efficiency, 
energy  and  atmosphere,  materials  and  resources,  indoor e nvironmental  quality,  and 
innovation in design. A LEED certificate is awarded based on the aggregate score, where 
the level of the award can range from certified (pass) to platinum (excellent). There are 
separate programs for existing buildings and newly developed buildings. 
As  of  June  2008,  approximately  1,400  buildings  had  been  awarded  a  LEED 
certificate. 
The  addresses  and  postal  codes  of  the  Energy  Star  and  LEED  buildings  are 
publicly available. We match these addresses to office buildings listed in the  CoStar 
database. CoStar is the major repository and provider of commercial real estate financial 
data.  The  CoStar  Group  maintains  records  on  some  2.4  million  properties,  including 
commercial property transactions, current rental and occupancy data, and the hedonic 
characteristics  of  buildings.  As  of  June  2008,  1,360  office  buildings  in  the  Costar 
database were matched with a green label; 1,045 buildings were matched to those with an 
EnergyStar certification, 286 buildings were matched to a LEED certification, and 29 
buildings had a certification from both organizations. 
Figure 1 provides a geographic summary of our match between the Energy Star-
certified commercial office buildings, the LEED-certified buildings, and the population 
of commercial buildings identified in CoStar. The figure reports the number of certified 
commercial office buildings in each state, as well as an estimate of the fraction of office 
space in each  state that has been rated for environmental sustainability.
4 About three 
percent of U.S. office building space is green-labeled. As the map indicates, in some 
                                                 
4 Ratios based upon  the  CoStar data probably overstate  the fraction of green office  space  in  the U.S. 
inventory, since CoStar’s coverage of smaller and older office buildings is less complete.  
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states – notably Texas, Washington, and Minnesota – more than five percent of office 
buildings  are  rated.  The  incidence  of  green  office  space  is  almost  nine  percent  in 
California – 122 million square feet of office space are labeled. In a large number of 
states, however, only a small fraction of office space is certified by EnergyStar or LEED. 
Apart from California, states with extreme temperatures are apparently more likely to 
have rated office buildings. 
 
– Insert Figure 1 about here – 
 
The Tenant Sample 
For each green building in the sample, we assembled the names of the five largest 
tenants,  their  Standard  Industry  Classification  (SIC)  code,  and  the  floor  space  they 
occupy. In addition, the CoStar Tenant Module allowed us to determine the total square 
footage of green office space occupied by each individual firm. Similarly, we collected 
data on the total square footage of green office space that is occupied in each specific 
four-digit SIC code.
5 This matching and data extraction yielded a sample of 1,180 green 
office buildings, occupied by a total of 3,179 different tenants. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the green space occupied by the twenty largest 
tenants in the U.S. Column (1) shows the extent of green space occupied by each tenant. 
Commercial banks, such as Wells Fargo Bank, Bank of America, and ABN-AMRO are 
all among the largest consumers of green space. This can be partially explained by their 
extensive  use  of  office  space  in  general;  the  banking  industry  is  notoriously  space 
                                                 
5  The  totals  of  green  office  space  occupied  by  individual  tenants  or  industry  groups  are  probably 
underestimated, as CoStar covers approximately eighty percent of the U.S. commercial property market. 
Moreover, tenant data are not available for all green office buildings.   
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intensive. This is in line with Proposition I, in which we hypothesize that firms in the 
tertiary sector are more likely to rent green space. Furthermore, in support of Proposition 
V, federal government and government-related organizations such as the Department of 
Health and Human Sciences and the Environmental Protection Agency are prominent 
tenants of green office space. Last, the oil industry seems to be well represented in green 
office buildings, with tenants such as Shell and Chevron leasing a substantial percentage 
of the green buildings office stock. This is in line with Proposition III. 
To account for differences in office space utilization among industries, column (4) 
shows the total square footage of office space occupied by the largest green tenants and 
column (5) presents the green office stock rented by each tenant, relative to the total 
office stock it occupies (as reported in CoStar). Several trends are apparent. First, the 
California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA) is not only among the top-twenty 
occupants of green office space, but all of its office stock has a green label. Indeed, the 
agency boasts that its headquarters building in Sacramento, California is equipped with 
state-of-the-art techniques to improve indoor air quality and to reduce energy use and that 
it is among the world's most energy and resource-efficient buildings. They note that the 
building “gives a physical presence to the reality of an agency whose single task is to 
guard the great environment.” This is a clear example of how non-profit or governmental 
organizations derive non-financial utility from leasing green, and can lead the way in 
sustainable  property  investments,  supporting  Proposition  V.  As  mentioned  on  the 
Cal/EPA website, “this approach not only makes environmental sense, but it also makes 
the building a better place to visit and in which to work.” This motivation is clearly in 
line with Proposition IV.  
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Some of the commercial banks are not only prominent tenants of green space in 
absolute terms, but also relative to their total office stock. For example, ABN-AMRO and 
Wells Fargo lease substantial proportions of their total office needs – 58 percent and 37 
percent, respectively – in green buildings. For the former, the headquarters in Chicago 
provide the main explanation: the 1.3 million square foot office building, which makes up 
most  of  the  office  stock  leased  by  ABN-AMRO,  was  awarded  a  “LEED  for  new 
construction” label at the gold level in 2007. Wells Fargo occupies several buildings with 
a green label. In fact, sustainability is a major strategic issue, and the bank has a well-
articulated sustainability policy. In interviews conducted by telephone with the authors, a 
representative  explained  that  “...it  is  important  to  show  our  environmental  focus,  for 
example, by leasing green office space.” As argued by Ramus and Montiel (2005), it is 
the implementation of CSR policies rather than the policy commitment that is necessary 
to reap direct business benefits. This is in line with reputation Proposition II, as leasing 
space in a green building may send a signal of social awareness to stakeholders. 
For  other  corporations,  such  as  Adobe  Systems,  Compuware  Corp.,  or  The 
Vanguard Group, leasing green space may not be a deliberate act, but it may merely 
come with a preference for high quality office space, in combination with a growing need 
for space due to rapid expansion. Indeed, it has been shown that green buildings are in 
general newer, have a higher quality rating, and have more amenities in comparison to 
conventional office buildings (Eichholtz, et al, 2009). Alternatively, the location of firm 
activities in green buildings may attract and retain highly qualified employees. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the twenty tenants documented in Table 1 occupy 
almost one sixth of the total inventory of green office space in the United States. As  
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reported in Appendix table A1, forty tenants in the US consume almost thirty percent of 
the entire stock of green office space in the country. 
 
– Insert Table 1 about here – 
 
Table  2  reports  the  aggregate  amount  of  green  office  space  occupied  by  the 
largest four-digit SIC codes, in absolute terms as well as relative to the total office stock 
occupied by the SIC code. Column (1) shows the twenty industry categories with the 
highest aggregate of total green office space. Legal services – which includes attorneys 
and  their  support  staffs  –  is  by  far  the  largest  occupant  of  green  office  space.  This 
contrasts with the results reported in Table 1, where only a single tenant from the legal 
services industry was among the top twenty. Although individual tenants from the legal 
services industry are not major occupiers of green space, the sector as a whole has a clear 
preference for sustainable office buildings. This reflects the fact that firms in the legal 
services industry are relatively small, so their choices are not clearly visible at the level of 
the individual firm when ranked by absolute total green space consumption. The result is 
in line with Propositions I and IV, wherein we argue that tenants in the tertiary sector are 
more likely to lease space in green buildings, as the direct benefits of leasing green space 
affect  these  tenants  most.  A  superior  indoor  environment  is  attractive  to  the  human 
capital employed. 
Other industry categories that are among the largest tenants of green space are 
Public  Administration,  National  Commercial  Banks,  Crude  Petroleum  and  Gas,  and  
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Investment Advisors. This is generally in line with the evidence in Table 1, and supports 
Propositions I and III. 
In Column (5), where we document the incidence of green space as a percentage 
of total office space occupied by the sector (as reported in CoStar), we observe that 63 
percent of the total office stock occupied by the Crude Petroleum and Gas industry is 
leased in office buildings with a green label. This fraction is far higher than it is for other 
industries, and supports our Proposition III; firms in environmentally sensitive industries 
have  a  higher  likelihood  of  leasing  green.  For  example,  Chevron  Corp.  has  recently 
occupied a newly developed building in Louisiana, which has been awarded a LEED 
Gold  certification.  Leasing  green  space  “supports  the  company's  long-standing 
commitment to the Gulf Coast and the state of Louisiana. The building is located in a 
park-like setting, and the three hundred thousand square foot office building provides a 
safe, healthy and productive workplace for up to 750 people.”
6 Although this expression 
of social and environmental awareness is unrelated to the core business of Chevron, it 
might help to improve its reputation among stakeholders. 
 
– Insert Table 2 about here – 
 
Control Sample 
Industry observers note that the three most important attributes of real estate are 
“location, location, and location.” We take this maxim seriously by matching each green 
building to a set of commercial office buildings which are in close proximity. In this way, 
we identify clusters of nearby buildings. Each cluster contains one green office building 
                                                 
6 Chevron Press Release, May 2008.  
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and all other office buildings within a 0.25 mile radius. This match, which relies upon the 
latitude  and  longitude  recorded  for  each  green  building,  yielded  1,180  clusters,  each 
containing one green building and an average of three nearby control buildings.  
Figure 2 illustrates the research design with examples from three different urban 
environments. For the green building depicted in Chicago, the map indicates that there 
are 41 non-green office buildings within the surrounding 0.2 square miles. For the green 
building  in  Houston,  there  are  six  nearby  non-green  buildings,  while  for  the  green 
building in Columbus, there is only one non-green building within a quarter of a mile. 
For each control building, we collect information on the five major tenants, their 
SIC  classifications  and  their  square  footage  occupied.  In  total,  the  control  sample 
includes 4,390 office buildings, with approximately 8,000 unique tenants. Appendix A 
provides an overview of the  control sample – tenants and industries with the largest 
aggregate office stock. 
 
– Insert Figure 2 about here – 
 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Tenant Concentration in Green Versus Non-Green Buildings 
  In Section 2 we hypothesize that specific industries may have a higher likelihood 
of leasing green office space, for example governmental and non-profit organizations – to 
maximize non-financial utility – or the oil industry – to offset negative reputation effects 
from  environmentally  sensitive  operations.  To  investigate  this,  we  first  calculate  the 
fraction of leased office space per building for each tenant. Then, we aggregate these  
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fractions  based  on  one-digit  SIC  codes  for  each  green  building  and  each  control 
building.
7  For  each  building,  this  yields  the  distribution  of  office  space  by  major 
industrial category, matched with the characteristics of that building – such as building 
age, size, and quality, and the presence of an Energy Star and/or LEED certification. 
  We  first  investigate  differences  in  tenant  composition  in  green  versus 
conventional  office  buildings.  For  instance,  if  green  buildings  serve  as  a  “flag”  for 
corporations, these buildings may be more likely to be owner-occupied or to have a more 
concentrated tenant base. We calculate Herfindahl indices of tenant concentration for 
each green building and its corresponding set of control buildings. 
(1)     
=
=
I
1 i
2
in n O H , 
  where Hn is the Herfindahl index for building n, Oin is the total square footage 
occupied by tenant i as a percentage of the total occupied office space in building n.  
Figure 3A reports the difference in Herfindahl indices for each green building and 
its corresponding control buildings. The differences are evenly distributed, with a fat tail 
on the left. This implies that there is a less concentrated tenant base, in terms of industrial 
category,  in  green  buildings.  However,  this  raw  comparison  does  not  control  for 
differences  in  building  quality  or  other  unobserved  characteristics.  This  may  be 
important, as green buildings are found to be larger than conventional office buildings 
(Eichholtz, et al, 2009). This could well lead to a more dispersed tenant base. Figures 3B 
and 3C report the difference in Herfindahl indices based on the number of industries and 
                                                 
7 We use one-digit SIC code aggregates rather than two-, three-, or four-digit SIC codes, as these would not 
yield  a  reasonable  number  of  observations  per  industry.  Following  the  standard  industry  classification 
structure, we group industries  in 1) Agriculture,  Forestry and Fishing, 2)  Mining and  Construction, 3) 
Manufacturing, 4) Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services, 5) Wholesale and 
Retail Trade, 6) Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, 7) Services and 8) Public Administration. 
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the difference in the fraction of office space occupied by the largest tenant, respectively. 
Figure 3B shows that in both green and control buildings, there tends to be a clustering of 
tenants  that  are  in  the  same  industry,  as  indicated  by  the  large  number  of  zero 
observations. Figure 3C shows that the fraction of space occupied by the largest tenant 
does not substantially differ between green buildings at the set of control buildings.  
 
– Insert Figure 3 about here – 
 
These first comparisons do not indicate that green buildings are more frequently 
occupied  by  one  major  tenant.  However,  these comparisons  do  not  control  at  all  for 
building and location quality. To control specifically for quality and locational effects, we 
estimate the following equation: 
(2) 
  
  
(Hgn  Hcn) =  +  n(X gn   Xcn)+  nc n
n=1
N
  + n, 
where the dependent variable is the difference between the Herfindahl index in 
green building g versus control building c in a cluster n. We estimate Equation (2) for 
two separate Herfindahl indices: one based on the distribution of tenants in the building 
and  the  other  on  the  distribution  of  industries  in  the  building.  We  also  estimate  this 
equation using as the dependent variable the difference in the fraction of space occupied 
by the largest tenant in a green building and each of the corresponding control buildings. 
(Xgn – Xcn) is a vector of the hedonic characteristics of the green building – building age, 
building  size  and  building  quality  –  in  cluster  n,  minus  the  corresponding  quality 
characteristics of the control building. cn is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a 
building is located in cluster n and zero otherwise. If there are N clusters, and cluster n is  
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composed  of  Mn  buildings,  then  there  are 
  
  
Mn  1 ( )
n=1
N
    observations  in  the  regression. 
These  location  coefficients  account  for  the  unobserved  characteristics  related  to  each 
specific location. We include one dummy for each of the  N distinct 0.2 square mile 
clusters.   ,   n,  and   n  are  estimated  coefficients  and  n  is  an  error  term. Results  are 
presented  in  Table  3  for  ordinary  least  squares  regression  models  corrected  for 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). 
Column (1) reports regressions using the difference in tenant concentration as the 
dependent  variable.  The  estimated  intercept,   ,  indicates  that  tenant  concentration  in 
green  buildings  is,  on  average,  33  percentage  points  greater  than  for  otherwise 
comparable  office  buildings  without  an  Energy  Star  or  LEED  label.  Note  that  this 
difference persists after controlling for variations in building age, quality, and size, and 
after  taking  into  account  the  cluster-specific  location  attributes.  In  column  (2),  the 
dependent variable is the difference in the fraction of office space occupied by the largest 
tenant  in  green  versus  non-green  buildings.  Holding  building  quality  and  location 
constant, the largest tenants in green buildings occupy 31 percentage points more space 
on  average  than  tenants  in  conventional  office  buildings.  This  suggests  that  green 
buildings are more likely to have a large key – or anchor – tenant, which again suggests 
that  the  larger  corporations  in  an  industry  use  green  buildings,  for  example,  to 
demonstrate commitment to corporate social responsibility. The results in Column (3) 
indicate that the tenant base is more diverse in green buildings, with the Herfindahl index 
of  industry  concentration  on  average  14  percentage  points  lower  than  in  otherwise 
comparable regular office buildings. 
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– Insert Table 3 about here – 
 
The likelihood of leasing green 
To investigate the extent to which firms in specific industries are more likely to 
lease green space rather than conventional office space, we analyze the fraction of office 
space occupied by a single-digit SIC code in a green building and the fraction occupied 
by  the  same  industry  in  the  otherwise  comparable  control  building.  This  analysis 
indicates the likelihood of leasing green space for a specific industry. We estimate the 
following equation for each one-digit SIC code: 
 (3)  
  
  
Oin =  +  iXi +  nc n
n=1
N
  + gi + in, 
where  the  dependent  variable  is  the  total  square  footage Oin  occupied  by  tenants  in 
building i in cluster n as a fraction of total occupied office space in the building. Xi is a 
vector of hedonic characteristics of building i – building age, building size and building 
quality and cn is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a building is located in cluster n 
and  zero  otherwise.  These  location  coefficients  allow  for  differences  in  tenant 
concentration at each location, and they account for unobserved characteristics related to 
each specific location. gi is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if building i is rated by 
Energy Star or LEED and zero otherwise.  ,  i,  n, and 
  
  are estimated coefficients and 
 in is an error term. 
Table 4 presents estimates of Equation (3), with each column corresponding to a 
specific industry group. The dependent variable represents the fraction of office space 
occupied by tenants in the corresponding industry group. Because the dependent variable 
has a large number of zeros (i.e., an industrial category rents no space in a particular  
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building),  we  estimate  equation  (3)  as  a  Tobit  model.  In  any  case,  the  estimated 
coefficients indicate the propensities of different industries to locate in various kinds of 
buildings. Note the propensity of firms in the transport, communication, electric, gas, and 
sanitary services sectors to choose larger and higher quality buildings (Column 2), and 
the propensity of firms in the retail and wholesale trade industries to chose lower quality 
office space (Column 3). In contrast, public tenants are more likely to choose higher 
quality space. 
Column (1) reports the results for the manufacturing industry, which includes 
everything  ranging  from  apparel  producers  to  car  manufacturers.  Office  utilization  is 
expected to be rather limited for these sectors. Indeed, the main explanatory variables are 
inconclusive, and the indicator variable for a green building has no significant effect. The 
same holds for the transportation and communications industry, as documented in column 
(2).  Office  space  leased  by  retail  and  wholesale  trade  is  mainly  in  small  buildings 
relatively  lower  quality.  As  green  certification  is  more  prevalent  in  new  and  large 
buildings, the negative coefficient for the indicator variable for green buildings is in line 
with expectations.
8 
Columns  (4)  and  (5)  report  results  for  the  finance,  insurance  and  real  estate 
industry, and the services industry, respectively. Especially for these industries, which 
include legal services and commercial banking, one would expect that leasing space in 
green office buildings is rational, as energy efficiency (Proposition I) and perceptions 
about indoor air quality (Propositions I and IV) are of major importance. However, in 
contrast to expectations, the results indicate a negative coefficient on the green variable 
                                                 
8 Note moreover that for retail and wholesale trade, it is more informative to examine the extent to which 
the  actual  retail  space  has  been  awarded  a  green  certificate,  rather  than  the  office  buildings  that  are 
measured here. This is clearly an avenue for future research.  
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for both estimations. So, although descriptive evidence in the previous section indicated 
that some firms in the finance and services industry are among the larger tenants of green 
space,  a  more  pervasive  trend  towards  leasing  green  cannot  be  documented  in  these 
industries when controlling appropriately for building and location quality. This suggests 
that it is rather the larger and most visible firms that move first in the implementation of 
social and environmental measures, only followed later by the critical mass in the same 
industry (Proposition II). 
Finally, in line with Proposition V, tenants in public administration seem to have 
a preference for green office space, indicated by the positive and significant coefficient 
for the green dummy as documented in Column (6). These results show the increased 
occupancy  of  green  space  by  government-related  tenants  relative  to  otherwise 
comparable  regular  office  space,  while  controlling  for  quality  and  locational 
characteristics. 
 
– Insert Table 4 about here – 
 
To investigate further the likelihood that certain industries will lease green space rather 
than conventional office space, we compare the fraction of office space occupied by a 
specific industry in a green building with the fraction occupied by the same industry in 
each control building in the same cluster. In this more refined model, we also include 
summary measures of variations in the average characteristics of each one-digit industry 
code by metropolitan area. We estimate the following equation for each one-digit SIC 
code:  
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(4)  
  
  
(Ogn  Ocn) =  +  n(X gn   Xcn)+  nc n
n=1
N
  + nYn + n, 
where the dependent variable is the difference between the fraction of square footage 
occupied by tenants in green building g in cluster n and the fraction of square footage 
occupied by tenants in control building c – where c is located in the same cluster. (Xgn – 
Xcn)  is  a  vector  of  the  hedonic  characteristics  of  the  green  building –  building  age, 
building  size  and  building  quality  –  in  cluster  n,  minus  the  corresponding  quality 
characteristics in the control building. cn is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if building 
n is located in cluster n and zero otherwise. These location coefficients can individually 
affect the percentage of square feet occupied and account for unobserved characteristics 
related  to  the  specific  location.  To  control  further  for  differences  in  the  average 
characteristics of industries across metropolitan areas, we include a vector Yn of variables 
measuring average employee output, payroll per employee, the number of employees per 
establishment, and the number of establishments. These data were computed for each 
one-digit SIC code by MSA.
9  ,  n,  n and   
  
 nare estimated coefficients and  n is an error 
term.  
Results  are  presented  in  Table  5  for  ordinary  least  squares  regression  models 
corrected for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). Each column corresponds to a specific 
one-digit  SIC  code.  Holding  other  factors  in  the  regression  constant,  the  intercept 
indicates whether the fraction of office space occupied by tenants in a specific industry is 
larger (or smaller) in green office buildings as compared to regular office buildings. For 
most industries, the constant is significantly negative, which indicates that tenants are 
                                                 
9 The raw data was obtained form the Office of Advocacy, US Small Business Administration (based on 
data provided by the US Census Bureau for 1977).  
 
30 
 
more  likely  to  lease  space  in  conventional  office  buildings  rather  than  in 
environmentally-labeled buildings. This is consistent with the small fraction of the total 
office stock that has a certified label. 
Exceptions to the pattern of significantly negative coefficients are the ‘Mining 
and Construction’ and ‘Public Administration’ industries. The former has a significantly 
positive constant, which indicates that tenants in this industry group, on average, lease 
more office space in green buildings than in non-green office buildings, controlling for 
differences in building quality. This finding is in line with Proposition III, which states 
that “...firms with environmentally sensitive operations will be more likely to lease green 
office space, as this can help to offset otherwise more negative corporate images.” As 
documented in Table 2, companies in the mining and construction industry have a large 
fraction  of  office  inventory  in  green  buildings,  which  is  confirmed  by  the  results  in 
Column (2) of Table 5. We find an insignificant difference in space occupied in green 
buildings as compared to regular buildings for the Public Administration sector. This 
means that, relative to conventional office buildings in the same geographical area, the 
government and government-related tenants do not occupy significantly more space in 
green office buildings. 
The  variables  measuring  the  concentration  of  establishments  and  labor 
productivity are generally statistically significant, suggesting that there are variations in 
the propensity to “lease green” by SIC across metropolitan areas – arising from variations 
in industry characteristics across metropolitan areas.  
We measure the clustering of certain industries by including a variable on the 
number of establishments for a specific industry in a metropolitan area. The coefficient is  
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negative for the finance, insurance, real estate and services industry. This implies that in 
areas with a higher office space density, the likelihood of leasing green office space 
rather than conventional office space is smaller. These locations are likely to be in, or 
very close to, the Central Business District, usually the location having the best locational 
quality. This result confirms previous research, e.g., Eichholtz, et al, (2009), who found 
that the increased rents and market values reported for green buildings were smaller at the 
best locations. The variable representing the average size of establishments in terms of 
number of employees is significantly positive for four out of five industries. This implies 
that in larger companies, there is a preference of green office space over conventional 
office space, as suggested in Proposition II. 
For the variable measuring the payroll per employee – which is a proxy for the 
quality of human capital – the coefficient is almost consistently positive. Recall that this 
variable varies for each industry group by metropolitan area. This implies that tenants 
who are more dependent on high levels of human capital are more likely to rent office 
space in green buildings, confirming Proposition IV. Moreover, the significantly positive 
coefficient on the variable measuring sales per  employee indicates that in areas with 
higher employee productivity – or more value-added per employee – tenants across all 
industries are more likely to lease green rather than conventional office space.  
More productive companies employing more human capital are more likely to 
rent space in these same buildings. 
 
–  Insert Table 5 about here – 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Awareness  is  growing  that  the  built  environment  is  important  as  a  source  of 
greenhouse emissions and as a major consumer of energy and raw materials. Firms more 
conscious  of  corporate  social  responsibility  may  therefore  include  real  estate  in  their 
strategic decision-making by leasing environmentally-labeled office space. 
Prior evidence has shown that some corporate tenants are not only willing to lease 
space in green office buildings, but that these tenants pay a rental premium as well. We 
identify four determinants of the penetration of CSR in real estate decision-making. From 
these, we develop six propositions about which firms or industries are willing to rent 
green space and to pay the rental premium. By building a comprehensive description of 
the tenants in U.S. office buildings with a green label – awarded by Energy Star or the 
USGBC – we address these propositions. 
The descriptive results show that the oil industry is a major consumer of green 
office space, which follows from a general proposition that firms in environmentally 
sensitive industries will actively incorporate sustainability in strategic decisions such as 
headquarters selection (perhaps merely to enhance reputation). Firms in the legal and 
financial services industry lease a substantial share of green office space as well. For 
some of these firms, further investigation shows support for our proposition that firms in 
the tertiary sector acknowledge the productivity benefits of green buildings. However, it 
is likely that for other firms, leasing green is a result of the preference for high quality 
buildings, rather than a conscious act of “responsible behavior,” since green buildings are 
usually higher-quality buildings.  
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We then address tenant composition in green buildings as compared to a matched 
set of conventional office buildings. We find that, controlling for differences in quality 
and  unobserved  locational  characteristics,  tenants  are  more  concentrated  in  green 
buildings, occupying larger shares of the buildings. This may indicate the desire to use a 
building as a flag to signal commitment to CSR. 
In general, the descriptive evidence confirms our propositions, to the extent that 
the expected industries each have a few “green” leaders. However, the results of the 
regression  and  Tobit-analyses  are  less  clear:  a  statistically  significant  commitment  to 
green space usage currently only exists for the manufacturing and mining industry and 
for  public  administration,  respectively.  These  findings  confirm  the  proposition  that 
companies  with  socially  challenging  operations  may  use  green  buildings  to  offset 
negative  reputation  effects.  Moreover,  the  government  and  government-related 
organizations, for which non-financial utility is of major importance, are substantially 
more likely to rent green office space than are other sectors. The most prominent example 
is California’s Environmental Protection Agency, with all of its activities located in a 
highly sophisticated environmental-friendly office building. 
It also turns out that the concentration and size of establishments, as well as the 
extent to which human capital is available in certain metropolitan areas, has a distinct 
positive  influence  on  the  fraction  of  environmentally-labeled  space  that  is  leased  by 
particular industries. 
For developers and investors, this has important implications. The higher initial 
outlay that may be needed for a newly developed sustainable office building, or for the 
refurbishment of an existing office building, can be recouped through energy savings and  
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lower risk premiums, or through higher net rents. Currently, industry leaders and non-
profit organizations (i.e. government) seem to be most willing to pay this rental premium. 
However, for the critical mass to engage in renting green, more insight in direct and 
indirect benefits of such a strategy is needed first. This paper provides only the first step 
in that.  
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FIGURE 1 
Distribution of Green Office Buildings by State 
(percent of the stock of office space) 
2008 
 
 
Note:  # represents the number of green office buildings in a state  
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FIGURE 2 
Clusters of Green and Control Buildings 
 
A. Chicago, IL 
 
 
 
B. Houston, TX 
 
 
 
C. Columbus, OH 
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FIGURE 3 
Distribution of the Differences in Tenant Concentration 
in Green and Control Buildings 
(Herfindahl Index) 
 
A. Difference in Tenant Concentration (Herfindahl Index) 
 
B. Difference in Industry Concentration (Herfindahl Index) 
 
C. Difference in Fraction of Space Occupied by the Largest Tenant  
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TABLE 1 
Incidence of Green Space Utilization by Major Tenants 
Fraction of Firm’s Office Space Housed in Green Buildings 
 
    Space Occupied 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Tenant Name  Industry Description  Green Office 
Space 
Fraction of Total 
Green Space 
Cumulative 
Fraction of Total 
Green Space 
Total Space 
CoStar 
Green Space as 
Fraction of Total 
Space Rentals 
       x 1000 sq. ft.  %  %   x 1000 sq. ft.  % 
Wells Fargo Bank  National Commercial Banks  2,741  1.61%  1.61%  7,343  37.33% 
United States Government  General Government  2,415  1.42%  3.03%  14,631  16.50% 
Bank of America  National Commercial Banks  2,124  1.25%  4.28%  18,695  11.36% 
ABN AMRO  State Commercial Banks  1,724  1.01%  5.29%  2,993  57.60% 
State of California  General Government  1,568  0.92%  6.21%  5,706  27.49% 
Deloitte and Touche  Accounting, Auditing, Bookkeeping   1,554  0.91%  7.13%  5,131  30.28% 
Best Buy  Radio, Television, Consumer Electronics   1,500  0.88%  8.01%  2,104  71.31% 
U.S. Dept. of Health – Human Sc.  General Government  1,442  0.85%  8.86%  1,662  86.72% 
Shell  Gasoline Service Stations  1,362  0.80%  9.66%  3,989  34.14% 
Chevron  Gasoline Service Stations  1,229  0.72%  10.38%  6,181  19.88% 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield  Hospital and Medical Service Plans  1,211  0.71%  11.09%  12,251  9.89% 
Adobe Systems  Prepackaged Software  1,158  0.68%  11.77%  1,388  83.43% 
Compuware Corporation  Prepackaged Software  1,094  0.64%  12.41%  1,300  84.18% 
American Express  Personal Credit Institutions  1,018  0.60%  13.01%  6,754  15.07% 
The Vanguard Group  Investment Advice  990  0.58%  13.59%  1,569  63.07% 
Cal/EPA  Land, Mineral, Wildlife, Forest Conservation  950  0.56%  14.15%  950  100.00% 
Mitre Corporation  Commercial Physical and Biological Research  944  0.55%  14.71%  1,293  73.02% 
JP Morgan Chase  Investment Advice  907  0.53%  15.24%  10,670  8.50% 
Skadden Arps  Legal Services  889  0.52%  15.76%  1,751  50.77% 
Ernst and Young  Accounting, Auditing, Bookkeeping   864  0.51%  16.27%  4,149  20.83%  
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TABLE 2 
Incidence of Green Space Utilization by Industry 
Fraction of Office Space Housed in Green Buildings by Four-Digit SIC 
 
    Space Occupied 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
SIC Code  Industry Description  Green Office 
Space 
Fraction of Total 
Green Space 
Cumulative 
Fraction of Total 
Green Space 
Total Office 
Space CoStar 
Green as 
Fraction of Total 
Space Rentals 
      x 1000 sq. ft.  %  %   x 1000 sq. ft.  % 
8111  Legal Services  25,593  15.04%  15.04%  217,097  11.79% 
6021  National Commercial Banks  9,436  5.55%  20.59%  86,782  10.87% 
9199  Executive, Legislative and General Office  9,035  5.31%  25.90%  67,081  13.47% 
1311  Crude Petroleum and Gas  7,076  4.16%  30.06%  11,304  62.60% 
6282  Investment Advice  6,532  3.84%  33.90%  100,939  6.47% 
8721  Accounting, Auditing, and Bookkeeping Services  5,158  3.03%  36.93%  136,766  3.77% 
5731  Radio, Television, and Consumer Electronics Stores  1,531  0.90%  37.83%  3,888  39.37% 
9311  Public Finance, Taxation, and Monetary Policy  822  0.48%  38.31%  14,491  5.67% 
7373  Computer Integrated Systems Design  816  0.48%  38.79%  19,487  4.19% 
3812  Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, …  291  0.17%  38.96%  4,869  5.97% 
2759  Commercial Printing, NEC  287  0.17%  39.13%  3,996  7.17% 
3069  Fabricated Rubber Products, NEC  285  0.17%  39.30%  769  37.08% 
4731  Arrangement Transportation of Freight and Cargo  282  0.17%  39.46%  8,348  3.38% 
9621  Regulations and Adm. of Transportation Programs  280  0.16%  39.63%  9,115  3.07% 
7997  Membership Sports and Recreation Clubs  274  0.16%  39.79%  1,696  16.15% 
8641  Civic, Social, and Fraternal Associations  274  0.16%  39.95%  14,362  1.91% 
2086  Bottled and Canned Soft Drinks, Carbonated Waters  261  0.15%  40.10%  5,037  5.19% 
5411  Grocery Stores  253  0.15%  40.25%  8,363  3.03% 
4724  Travel Agencies  252  0.15%  40.40%  7,539  3.34% 
6552  Land Subdividers and Developers,   250  0.15%  40.55%  9,676  2.58% 
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TABLE 3 
Regression Results 
Differences in Tenant Concentration in Green Buildings and Non Green Buildings 
 
  Tenant Concentration  Largest Tenant  Industry Concentration 
  Building Age  -0.001***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
  Building Quality  -0.150***  -0.127***  -0.078*** 
  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.007] 
  Building Size  -0.061**  -0.031  -0.060*** 
(millions of sq. ft.)  [0.024]  [0.024]  [0.021] 
       
Constant  0.325***  0.311***  -0.142*** 
  [0.017]  [0.016]  [0.015] 
       
Observations  4309  4309  4309 
R
2  0.62  0.62  0.61 
Adj R
2  0.53  0.54  0.52 
 
Notes:   
The dependent variable in Column (1) is the difference in tenant concentration – as measured by 
the Herfindahl index – in a green building and each of the corresponding control buildings. 
The dependent variable in Column (2) is the difference in the fraction of space occupied by the 
largest tenant in a green building and each of the corresponding control buildings. 
The dependent variable in Column (3) is the difference in industry concentration among tenants – 
as measured by the Herfindahl index – in a green building and each of the corresponding control 
buildings. 
Each regression also includes 1,180 dummy variables, one for each district cluster. 
Standard errors are in brackets. Significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels are indicated by *, 
**, and ***, respectively.  
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TABLE 4 
Tobit Regression Results 
Industry Preference and Green Buildings 
Fraction of Office Space Occupied by One-Digit SIC code in each Building 
       
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Green Rating (1 = yes)  0.030  -4.134  -0.075  -0.478  -0.178  0.730 
  [0.028]  [0.000]  [0.028]***  [0.026]***  [0.019]***  [0.030]*** 
Building Class†             
Class A (1 = yes)  0.000  0.135  -0.125  0.041  -0.028  0.105 
  [0.041]  [0.061]**  [0.034]***  [0.029]  [0.027]  [0.050]** 
Class B (1 = yes)  -0.024  0.109  -0.059  0.029  -0.043  0.108 
  [0.031]  [0.043]**  [0.023]***  [0.021]  [0.020]**  [0.040]*** 
Fraction Occupied  -0.012  0.083  0.106  0.055  0.251  0.031 
  [0.076]  [0.106]  [0.060]*  [0.052]  [0.051]***  [0.088] 
Stories             
High (yes = 1)  0.034  -0.085  -0.152  0.013  -0.029  0.069 
  [0.042]  [0.059]  [0.037]***  [0.029]  [0.028]  [0.048] 
Intermediate (yes = 1)  0.018  -0.006  -0.095  -0.010  -0.042  -0.029 
  [0.029]  [0.040]  [0.024]***  [0.021]  [0.019]**  [0.034] 
Age             
< 10 years  0.016  0.014  0.065  0.020  0.071  0.049 
  [0.049]  [0.083]  [0.045]  [0.038]  [0.035]**  [0.057] 
10 – 20 years  0.026  -0.083  -0.051  0.007  0.009  0.071 
  [0.046]  [0.079]  [0.043]  [0.034]  [0.031]  [0.052] 
20 – 30 years  -0.052  -0.014  -0.012  0.005  0.020  0.092 
  [0.036]  [0.049]  [0.030]  [0.025]  [0.024]  [0.041]** 
30 – 40 years  -0.051  -0.005  -0.008  0.033  -0.013  0.012 
  [0.038]  [0.051]  [0.032]  [0.026]  [0.025]  [0.043] 
Renovated (1 = yes)   0.024  -0.060  -0.013  -0.061  0.016  0.049 
  [0.025]  [0.033]*  [0.020]  [0.017]***  [0.016]  [0.030]* 
Building Size  0.038  0.161  -0.180  0.077  -0.030  -0.194 
(millions of sq.ft.)  [0.052]  [0.073]**  [0.056]***  [0.038]**  [0.038]  [0.067]*** 
             
Constant  -0.424  -0.804  -0.525  -0.220  -0.315  -0.896 
  [0.099]***  [0.244]***  [0.095]***  [0.083]***  [0.075]***  [0.110]*** 
             
Sample Size  10462  10462  10462  10462  10462  10462 
 
2  1340.17  1123.84  1363.73  1482.93  1070.80  2104.36 
Pseudo R
2  0.26  0.29  0.20  0.16  0.08  0.28 
 
Notes: 
Columns correspond to one-digit Standard Industrial Classifications: 
(1) Manufacturing 
(2) Transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services 
(3) Retail and wholesale trade 
(4) Finance, insurance, and real estate 
(5) Services 
(6) Public administration 
 
† Relative to building Class C 
Each regression also includes 1,180 dummy variables, one for each distinct cluster. 
Standard errors are in brackets. Significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
  
 
45 
 
 
TABLE 5 
Regression Results 
Industry Preference and Green Buildings 
Differences in Fraction Occupied in Green Buildings and Non Green Buildings 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Building Age  -0.005  0.000  -0.000*  0.000  -0.000  -0.001***  0.000**  0.000 
  [0.004]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
  Building Quality  0.094  0.004  -0.040***  -0.005  -0.113***  0.029**  0.024*  0.003 
  [0.187]  [0.028]  [0.015]  [0.019]  [0.017]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.016] 
  Building Size   -0.114  0.020  0.023  0.007  -0.206***  0.178***  -0.122***  0.021 
(millions of sq. ft.)  [0.356]  [0.081]  [0.030]  [0.067]  [0.059]  [0.030]  [0.032]  [0.053] 
Employees Per Establishment      0.014***  0.002***  -0.003  0.026***  0.001***   
      [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.004]  [0.001]  [0.000]   
Number of Establishments      0.152***  0.225***  0.135***  -0.269***  -0.371***   
(log)      [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.006]  [0.009]  [0.005]   
Sales Per Employee      0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.007***  0.080***   
(thousands of dollars)      [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001]   
Payroll Per Employee      0.000***  0.000  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***   
(thousands of dollars)      [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]   
Constant  -1.421**  0.351***  -0.911***  -0.946***  -1.209***  -0.064***  -0.261***  -0.078 
  [0.615]  [0.057]  [0.035]  [0.080]  [0.094]  [0.021]  [0.056]  [0.094] 
                 
Sample Size  49  447  1231  1021  1689  3307  4109  1013 
R
2  0.97  0.89  0.85  0.83  0.71  0.70  0.60  0.87 
Adj R2  0.88  0.79  0.77  0.73  0.59  0.61  0.50  0.81 
Notes:   
Columns correspond to one-digit Standard Industrial Classifications: 
(1) Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 
(2) Mining and Construction 
(3) Manufacturing 
(4) Transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services 
(5) Retail and wholesale trade 
(6) Finance, insurance, and real estate 
(7) Services 
(8) Public administration 
 
Each regression also includes 1,180 dummy variables, one for each distinct cluster. 
 
Standard errors are in brackets. Significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels are indicated by *, **, 
and ***, respectively.  
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APPENDIX TABLE A1 
Incidence of Green Space Utilization by Major Tenants 
Incidence of Green Space Utilization by Major 4-digit SIC code 
 
    Space Occupied 
      (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Industry Description  Green Space  Fraction of Total 
Green Space 
Cumulative 
Fraction of Total 
Green Space 
       x 1000 sq. ft.  %  % 
Panel A: Top-20 Tenants 
JP Morgan Chase  Investment Advice  3,069  1.31%  1.31% 
Bank of America  National Commercial Bank  3,048  1.30%  2.61% 
US General Services Admin.  General Government, NEC  2,262  0.96%  3.57% 
Verizon Wireless  Communications Services, NEC  2,086  0.89%  4.46% 
ATandT  Telephone Communications  1,819  0.77%  5.23% 
Pfizer, Inc.  Pharmaceutical Preparations  1,724  0.73%  5.97% 
American Express  Personal Credit Institutions  1,632  0.70%  6.66% 
Morgan Stanley  Investment Advice  1,592  0.68%  7.34% 
Chevron  Crude Petroleum and Oil  1,568  0.67%  8.01% 
Charles Schwab  Unit Investment Trusts  1,454  0.62%  8.63% 
Wells Fargo Bank  National Commercial Bank  1,433  0.61%  9.24% 
Marsh and McLennan  Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service  1,244  0.53%  9.77% 
Washington Mutual  National Commercial Banks  1,109  0.47%  10.24% 
Department of Justice  General Government, NEC  1,094  0.47%  10.71% 
State Street Corporation  State Commercial Banks  1,045  0.45%  11.15% 
Pacific Gas and Electric  Electric and Other Services Combined  1,029  0.44%  11.59% 
BP  Crude Petroleum and Oil  949  0.40%  11.99% 
News America Marketing  Advertising, NEC  917  0.39%  12.39% 
Colorado Interstate Gas 
Comp,  Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution  912  0.39%  12.77% 
KPMG, LLP  Accounting, Auditing, Bookkeeping Services  910  0.39%  13.16% 
Panel B: Top-20 SICs 
8111  Legal Services  34,509  14.70%  14.70% 
9199  General Government  12,913  5.50%  20.20% 
6021  National Commercial Banks  10,141  4.32%  24.52% 
6282  Investment Advice  9,335  3.98%  28.50% 
6022  State Commercial Banks  5,355  2.28%  30.78% 
6411  Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service  5,241  2.23%  33.01% 
1311  Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas  5,031  2.14%  35.15% 
6211  Security Brokers, Dealers, Flotation Comp.  4,837  2.06%  37.21% 
4813  Telephone Communications  4,702  2.00%  39.22% 
8721  Architectural Services  4,108  1.75%  40.97% 
8742  Management Consulting Services  3,663  1.56%  42.53% 
2834  Pharmaceutical Preparations  3,492  1.49%  44.01% 
8221  Colleges, Universities, Professional Schools  3,252  1.39%  45.40% 
8399  Social Services, NEC  2,849  1.21%  46.61% 
4911  Electric Services  2,846  1.21%  47.83% 
7389  Business Services, NEC  2,752  1.17%  49.00% 
4899  Communications Services, NEC  2,544  1.08%  50.08%  
 
47 
 
6531  Real Estate Agents and Managers  2,541  1.08%  51.16% 
8711  Engineering Services  2,402  1.02%  52.19% 
8748  Business Consulting Services, NEC  2,188  0.93%  53.12% 
 